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ABSTRACT

The narrative of personal experience is considered in this paper as a canonical discourse genre from which various forms of expository patterns can be derived in a move towards decontextualized academic discourse. More specifically, the paper analyzes the multi-draft transition from a narrative of personal experience to a classification. The analysis in the paper is based on W. Chafe's (1994) recent approach to discourse analysis, using the concept of consciousness, with its need for orientation and point of view, and its relationship to the production of language. The paper makes the claim that a consciousness-based analytic tool represents a crucial link between linguistic analysis and composition pedagogy viewed as literacy action. Contains 19 references and a figure listing the modes and functions of consciousness. (RS)

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The Vanishing Narrator: Repositioning Stories of Personal Experience

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The Vanishing Narrator: Repositioning Stories
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Abstract

The narrative of personal experience is considered here as a canonical discourse genre from which various forms of expository patterns can be derived in a move towards decontextualized academic discourse. More specifically, this is an analysis of the multi-draft transition from a narrative of personal experience to a classification. The analysis is based on Chafe's recent approach to discourse analysis, using the concept of consciousness, with its need for orientation and point of view, and its relationship to the production of language. The claim is made that a consciousness-based analytic tool represents a crucial link between linguistic analysis and composition pedagogy viewed as literate action.

narrative, classification, consciousness, composition, discourse analysis

> When I was a child, my grandmother told me how Willard Street looked when she moved there during the thirties. "Planted from one end of the block to the other were big pretty trees," she said. Hers was the first black family to move to Willard; before, there were only white families. Then white neighbors did not interact with their African American neighbors, and people knew practically nothing about each other; it's the same way today.
>
> (Janice Grady, "Willard Street, Then and Now"[1])

An African American woman, in her early forties, returning to school to get an undergraduate degree, is thus beginning her thoroughly researched monograph on the vicissitudes of the inner-city neighborhood where she grew up. In the monograph, she organizes large amounts of information, both experiential and documentary, into discourse forms that we collectively call "academic discourse:" she compares and contrasts the different moments in the life of the neighborhood; she classifies people and buildings, behaviors and attitudes; she establishes causes for the changes she records; and indirectly, by wondering about the ever-shifting racial composition of Willard Street over the years, and the results of the social phenomenon of "gentrification," she argues for the old-fashioned values of her childhood.

The monograph developed gradually, from several short narratives of personal experience, written over a period of time, while the author was learning how to organize information differently from the narrative, and was thus entering academic discourse--"the language of power" that John Ogbu (1992), among others, argues

minority groups need to learn. Janice Grady shared Ogbu's opinion. She, and many other writers like her, was a skillful storyteller, with a large repertoire of stories accumulated over years of a trying life. I would like to show here how such writers gradually turn their narratives of personal experience, their model of the world, naturally centered around their selves, into the expository writing valued in the academic community, of which they are a part.

The narrative as a source of other expository patterns

That the narrative of personal experience is a preferred form of oral and written expression by many people is hardly an original statement. The personal narrative is not only present in our daily face-to-face interactions, but also has a long tradition in the oral and written literatures of most cultures, a tradition that has been broken only temporarily in Western post-modern literature. In a compelling account of storytelling revival in literature, Bill Buford speaks of the basic need for the narrative: "Implicit in the extraordinary revival of storytelling is the possibility that we need stories--that they are a fundamental unit of knowledge, the foundation of memory, essential to the way we make sense of our lives: the beginning, middle, and end of our *personal and collective trajectories*. It is possible that narrative is as important to writing as the human body is to representational painting." (emphasis added, 1996:12).

Such a strong acknowledgment does not imply a value judgment, with the narrative at the bottom of the discourse ladder; nor does it imply that other discourse forms are inventions of one culture, imposed *ex-cathedra* on other, narrative-based cultures. Furthermore, that there is no sharp discontinuity between the narrative of personal experience and other forms of expository discourse is evident in the fact that

narratives, oral or written, contain in them at least the rudiments of other forms: when we inform by telling stories, we do so by establishing cause and effect, by analyzing processes, by classifying, and so on. The narrative fragment at the beginning of this essay contains, for example, a comparison embedded in the narrative framework. Cross-culturally, while we can speak with some confidence of differences in superficial aspects of rhetorical organization among cultures, there is little evidence to support the claim that expository discourse, or argumentative discourse, for that matter, is the creation of a particular culture or group of cultures, incomprehensible to others.

In composition studies, the value of the narrative experience with novice writers has been recognized for some time, particularly in the move from the so-called "textual literacy" (Brandt, 1990), with its emphasis on the seemingly autonomous text, formally correct and conventionally appropriate, to "expressive literacy," focused on creative imagination (Williansky, 1990). The latter vision of literacy has seldom gone, however, beyond polishing the personal narrative, towards expanding it and exaggerating features already present, in the direction of the discourse which is at the center of academic writing. This essay, focusing as it is on the use of narratives of personal experience in the development, by adult writers, of extended classificatory essays, places itself within still another vision of literacy, one that has been called "rhetorical literacy" (Flower, 1996). Within rhetorical literacy, writing is viewed as a "socially embedded, socially shaped practice," and the writer as "an agent within a social and rhetorical context" (249). Such a writer is capable of effecting change by learning how different writerly perspectives, of source and conveyor of information, are enacted in language, within contexts that are personally meaningful to the writer. In this sense, the writing experience of Janice Grady, and other writers like her, which will be analyzed in more detail later, is, in Linda Flower's words, "literate action." This essay

is an attempt to describe such action in the movement from personal narrative to classification, by bridging the apparent gap between writing as "soul-opening" and writing as "gate-opening" (Heath, 1996: 231) to college life.

The writer's consciousness in literate action

Some have said that the relationship between linguistics and writing, or composition studies, is tenuous at best, "unable to confront the ideological issues of power and subjectivity" (Sullivan, 1995: 413) present in postmodern scholarly and pedagogic efforts. Others, equally disappointed by formalist tendencies in linguistics, have proposed a "linguistics of contact" (Pratt, 1987), whose goal is to study how group differences are expressed in language. It is my contention that Wallace Chafe's recent approach to discourse analysis (1994) provides one crucial connection between linguistics and writing. By placing *consciousness* in a central position with respect to both thought and language, his theoretical account enables us to confront at least important issues of subjectivity, if not also issues of power. Furthermore, through an examination of the role of consciousness along the continuum from face-to-face interaction and oral narratives to various kinds of written fiction and expository writing, Chafe allows a repositioning of the narrative (and even of orality) at the very heart of the composing process, where, I believe, it belongs. A short presentation of Chafe's conceptual framework is in order here, for it will provide us with the analytical tools to be employed later.

There is no need to examine Wallace Chafe's model as one more statement in the recent flurry of intellectual activity around consciousness, either from a philosophical perspective (e.g., Searle, 1995) or a biological one (e.g.,

Grossenbacher, 1996). Chafe simply launches the concept of consciousness simply and directly, by assuming that it exists and can be described, at least to some extent, through introspection: "Consciousness is an active focusing of a small part of the conscious being's self-centered model of the surrounding world." (28) His focus then becomes establishing relations between the "introspectively observable properties of consciousness," (27) such as its focus, dynamic character, point of view, and need for orientation, and the linguistic evidence that supports them. It is beyond the purpose of this essay to present Chafe's entire theoretical framework, nor will I be able to give it full justice by highlighting the most admirable of its qualities. I will simply confine myself to those aspects, essential to his approach, that prove to be most useful for an examination of language manipulation in the composing process..

Two basic distinctions made by Chafe are central to his explanation of how mind and language meet in consciousness, and they are equally crucial to an understanding of the transition from narratives of personal experience to extended classification. The first has to do with the qualitative difference between *extroverted* and *introverted* conscious experiences. The former, directly affected by the environment in terms of the operations of perceiving, evaluating, and acting, functions in the immediate mode, the actual time when the consciousness is affected. The latter functions in the displaced mode, by remembering and imagining experiences from an earlier consciousness. The second distinction between the immediate and displaced modes of handling experience concerns the two ways in which "consciousness enters in the production of language" (198). There are two functions of consciousness, that of providing ideas that are represented through language, and that of actually representing them in oral or written form. Chafe talks about a *represented* consciousness and a *representing* consciousness, but I believe the theory will gain in

economy and clarity if we think of the second distinction as exclusively a functional one. Thus, a schematic presentation of the modes and functions of consciousness would look as follows:

Insert Figure 1 Here

As we can see in Figure 1, the extroverted consciousness can exist only in the immediate mode, and the introverted consciousness only in the displaced mode, but both of them can perform, under specific circumstances, both the represented and the representing functions or just one of them.

When we are speaking about the "here and now," the extroverted consciousness does all the work, as it were: it produces the ideas introduced in the conversation, under the direct influence of the surrounding environment, and it expresses them linguistically; the extroverted consciousness, functioning as it always does in the immediate mode, performs both functions. However, in the conversational flow, one can easily switch modes, and move, say, from the "here and now " into an oral narrative of personal experience. In that case, the events are represented by a remote extroverted consciousness, the one that experienced the events, while the actual linguistic expression of the events, the representing function, is done by the proximal introverted consciousness, that of the narrator.

There are specific linguistic markers for these speaking situations, which have

to do, among others, with the expression of the time frame, of personal, spatial, and temporal frames, of given and old information. Verb tense, for instance, is "the way of linguistically marking the relation between the time of the extroverted consciousness and the time of a *representing* (not represented) consciousness. In the immediate mode there is no difference between the two, and the present tense expresses that fact... In the displaced mode the time of the extroverted consciousness and the time of the representing consciousness are different... In that case there can be more than just one temporal relation between the two." (206)

The displaced and the immediate modes under which consciousness works are manipulated even more in written language, and the manipulations become more intricate as we move from narratives of personal experience, or first-person narratives, to expository writing, as we will see in the following analysis of a writing sample.

First-person narrative at the heart of classification

Writing, as the operation of inscribing language in graphic systems, is most commonly taught, although one can imagine cases where, given the right circumstances, one can learn to write by modeling, without explicit instruction. The degrees of success vary, and the amount of teaching is not always directly commensurate with the quality of writing. Whether one considers the two language modes radically different or not, few writers would deny that there are some differences between the two, derived primarily from the difference in the communication channels. Prominent among them is the fact that writing is relatively planned and decontextualized. Writers have the opportunity, more often than not, to revise what they have written before it can be read by other people, and can, in the process, incorporate more linguistic reformulations than they

are able to do in speaking. Furthermore, writers are not in direct contact with their readers, but need, instead, to anticipate reactions, to do a lot more imagining, pretending, and adjusting, than one does in speaking.

The transition from written narratives of personal experience to expository writing, with the concept of consciousness at its center, will be illustrated with an example of a written narrative and several versions of a classification derived from it--a movement away from a personal trajectory. The texts were produced by Janice Grady, the writer with whose words I started this essay and who consented enthusiastically to having her real name used in this article. The narrative was written in her daily writing journal, meant to explore topics that could later be expanded into various kinds of expository writing, in her first writing class upon her return to school. She chose this journal entry, and more specifically a narrative included in the entry, as the starting point of a classification essay. The classification evolved very gradually, through three different drafts, on the basis of three model academic classifications and peer response to each of the drafts; its starting point is the portion of the narrative recorded below.

> This afternoon I went to take medicine to one of our clients. On the train there was a group of rowdy school children. Then there were all these conservatively dressed people coming back from work. They were annoyed. I am getting old. I can't stand these noisy children and their clothes. It's wonder they wear clothes, period.

(Janice Grady, "Journal Entry #6")

Of the types of written discourse Chafe analyzes, the narrative would be closest to what he calls "displaced immediacy," characteristic of written first-person fiction. According to that model, the introverted consciousness, the "I" who is representing the events is linked to the extroverted consciousness, the same "I," who experienced, or represented, them at a different point in time and space through "pretense of unconstrained remembering" (227). Within Chafe's model, displaced immediacy is signaled by a number of linguistic features, such as lack of temporal and spatial framing, richness of detail, deixis of immediacy (*now, here*) on the one hand; and consistent use of the past tense, to create displacement, on the other.

Now, let us examine the train narrative from that perspective. There is ample evidence of the first person point of view: three occurrences of "I," twice as the starting point, with references to the self's evaluations and attitudes:

1. I am getting old.
2. I can't stand these noisy children and their clothes.

In addition, the direction of the "conservatively dressed people" in the third sentence, *coming* back from work, may be signaling that the "I" is the deictic center although that would make for an unlikely reading: that the people are moving toward the speaker, who is on the train. A much more plausible interpretation of the deictic verb *come* is a movement to a generic home, a "home base" (Levinson, 84), shared by the people and the speaker.

The narrative contains very little evidence of displacement: the temporal orientation is an immediate past, but within that the first four sentences use the past

tense consistently use of the past tense.

3. This afternoon I *went* to take medicine...
4. On the train there *was* a group of rowdy children.
5. Then there *were* all these...
6. They *were* annoyed.

The use of the past tense in the first part of the narrative signals that the extroverted consciousness is not performing the function of representing. But towards the end of the passage, the text switches to the present tense. It is not the "historical present," the tense that pretends to relate imagined or remembered events as if they were happening in the immediate mode of the extroverted consciousness. It is, rather, the present of evaluations and attitudes, incongruous with written first-person fiction and with the very functional distinction between the two consciousnesses.

The same incongruity appears in the ways in which immediacy is expressed. The narrative is framed temporally (*this afternoon*) and spatially (*on the train*), and the amount of detail does not exceed that of ordinary remembering, the way it does in first-person fiction. In fact, there is little pretense of unconstrained remembering. As for the deixis of immediacy, there are two signals:

7. *This* afternoon I went...
8. Then there were *these* conservatively dressed people...

In (7), the proximal demonstrative signals recency (the narrative was probably written at the end of the day when the event happened, and the deixis signals that coding

time), while in (8), it introduces an indefinite noun phrase, with the meaning of "some/many" people, a common feature of contemporary *spoken* English.

The word "spoken" is set off because in the train narrative there is little evidence that the two functions are performed by different consciousnesses, or that the last three sentences form a unity with the narrative in terms of consciousness manipulation; in other words, the narrative has more features of a spoken than a written first-person narrative. First, while the story comes from a distant (albeit recent) extroverted consciousness, it is the introverted consciousness of the writer that appears to function both as representing it and being represented.

Second, starting with the fifth sentence, with the switch to evaluations, there is little reason to believe that we are dealing with indirect thought, which one would expect in a written narrative. The last three sentences of the narrative (*I am getting old. I can't stand these noisy children and their clothes. It's a wonder they wear clothes, period.)* are written in direct thought or direct speech, part of a monologue, with the punctuation mark of finality spelled out at the end. Although there is no clear evidence of interpreting the three final sentences as direct speech or direct thought, given the writer's tendency, apparent in subsequent drafts, to slip into thought about the narrated facts (e.g., 1-6), they may well be considered instances of direct thought.

Be that as it may, the entire narrative, devoid of detail, devoid of the effort to feign total recall and seamless flow, is simply a transcribed spoken narrative. It may be because of the spoken nature of the written narrative that the process of transforming it into a different kind of written discourse was so trying, as an analysis of examples from the three drafts of the transformation will demonstrate.

Drafting towards an impersonal classification

The train narrative contains in it the seeds of a classification, and this is what the writer chose to develop into a typology of subway riders, entitled "Rush Hour Subway Riders." With enough experientially derived knowledge about subway riders and the ability to imagine what could not be provided by direct experience, she found the task relevant and manageable.

Accounts of classifications appear in many guises: from the spontaneous, oral kind (usually dichotomous or at most tripartite because of time and processing limitations in oral interaction), open to self-modifications or modifications triggered by the conversational dynamics; to the carefully planned classification, which organizes the multiplicity of individual tokens, economically, into tightly formed, mutually exclusive types, or classes. Even in oral classifications, or typologies, the represented function remains unacknowledged, although it is the extroverted consciousness that performs both functions. In other words, even oral classifications are generic, given as inductively derived universal truths, without mention of the experiential basis of the classificatory operation: "There are three kinds of families." or "Some people are performers, other prefer to watch."

The classification as a pattern of expository writing requires, in addition, that the representing function of the consciousness "disappear," that is, be left unacknowledged. Indeed, in the first sentence of the first draft of the classification, which remains unchanged as a framing device for all the subsequent drafts, exhibits that feature.

1-1. There are five types of people who ride the metro train during the rush hour.

The self's observation has been replaced by a generic observation, coming, as it were, from nowhere. The tense-marked displacement of the narrative is replaced by the present tense--a "state present" (Quirk et al., 179), with no mention of a specific time to limit its applicability, a "timeless truth." In this sentence there is no evidence of a point of view or deictic center. Although we know that the information comes from various experiences of the extroverted consciousness, one of which is recorded in the train narrative, there is no direct evidence of it. However, no later than in the second sentence, the self reappears.

1-2. I am always amused watching them board and exit the train.

The representing and represented functions are collapsed into one--for a brief moment, the self is evaluating several experiences and acknowledging its point of view. Through the use of the habitual present of the verb, the self takes on a god-like perspective of reality, appearing briefly only to disappear once the classification itself starts.

1-3. The young men and women, dressed in their business suits, running down the escalator, act as if the last train is approaching even though there is no train in sight. They stand on the edge of the platform daring to be touched by anyone. Their behavior annoys other people, especially the casually dressed men and women.

The self that appeared in 1-2 is now generically organizing information that appears to come from nowhere and is conveyed to no one in particular, to an audience that is unknown because it is invisible. The transition from narratives of personal experience that include classifications to the classificatory essay is a change from a land where the writer's subjectivity is firmly and explicitly implanted, to an apparent no man's land, and from a private to a public time.

The first class of train riders in 1-3 is a definite, given, entity, one of the five types of people. There is descriptive detail, as well as evaluative comments (*daring to be touched, their behavior annoys*), which creates immediacy, but it is all presented generically: on any day, in any train station, one is bound to see people who would fit that description to every single detail! Here the point of view is that of an omniscient invisible narrator.

Although the self announced briefly in 1-2 is the proximal, representing self, evaluating her own attitude as a generic one, a different self creeps into the description of the second type of people, 'the casually dressed men and women.'

> 1-4. They, the casually dressed, stood wherever there was space and did not crowd other people...

Here, suddenly, we find evidence of the extroverted consciousness from the train narrative, through the use of the past tense, signaling that the time of the extroverted consciousness, of the actual experience of watching train people, precedes the time of representing. Temporarily, the omniscient point of view seems to slip into oblivion.

On the other hand, precisely because of the sudden switch to the past tense of ordinary narration in 1-4, the previous sentence could be reconsidered [2] in terms of verb tense: the switch to displaced narration could well have occurred in 1-3, with the historical present, rather than a state present; the draft then proceeds, with a short interruption of immediacy in 1-5, as a narrative to the very end. There is a definite ambiguity here between generic present, expected in a classification, and historical present, the tense of narratives--an ambiguity that the writer herself was unable to clarify. However, if we consider what the writer keeps and transforms in the subsequent drafts, the former interpretation appears more plausible.

In the following sentence, the present tense is resumed, and thus a token from the first class of young men and women, "a young woman (who is) applying her makeup" appears. The token is not a metonymic category, a woman standing for all women applying makeup on the platform; it is, rather, the extroverted consciousness of a distant time and its point of view that are making a strong comeback.

> 1-5. Further down the platform there is a young woman who is applying her makeup waiting for the train to arrive. She becomes annoyed when someone bumps into her.

The distant extroverted consciousness is signaled once more through referred-to thought:

> 1-6. I thought to myself, trying to apply makeup waiting for the subway can be stressful.

With the intrusion of the remote extroverted consciousness, the classification collapses, and a parade of individuals appears in a first-person narration. First, an old man:

> 1-7. I noticed this elderly man standing towards the back waiting for board the approaching train. Just as he was about to board the train, the bell rang twice, and the door began to close. The man was caught between the closing doors. It felt like a lifetime passed until the doors opened to free the man. He appeared frightened and angry. He stood there complaining that the doors close too fast.

Then, two parents with a baby:

> 1-8. Just as he was complaining, a mother and father approached pushing their baby in a stroller.

And finally, the rowdy school children from the train narrative:

> 1-9. As the school children began to board the train, they appeared to be happy and full of life. I noticed a young man wait until the bell rang before he tried to get on the train.

Unlike the initial train narrative from the journal entry, the narrative that ends this not entirely successful classification is full of detail, exhibiting 'pretense of unconstrained remembering' in the way in which Chafe talks about first-person fiction. There is clear evidence of the extroverted consciousness, which experienced the

events at a remote time, and of the introverted consciousness, which is remembering them. It seems as if the writer cannot suppress the consciousness that saw and evaluated the various people she is attempting to classify or the one that is representing them, until they are well-established, in vivid details, in her mind.

The second draft goes well through the first two classes. The first class is maintained from the first draft, while the class of elderly men and women is introduced as a class, followed by an illustrative narrative.

> 2-1. Elderly men and women stand back, as if afraid of the coming trains. They are nervous; they don't know if they have enough time to board the train. I once noticed an elderly man...(continues with the narrative in 1-7)

With the third class of people, young couples with babies, the extroverted consciousness reappears, with an unexpected switch to the past tense, and the definiteness of a particular set of parents.

> 2-2. Young couples with babies have to move fast. People did not allow *the* parents to move.

Once the intrusion occurs, the deixis of immediacy "now" appears as well, to introduce the final class of train people, in what appears to be the historical present.

> 2-3. Now the school children begin to board the train with laughter and joy.

It is only in the third draft that the five classes appear as we expect them, from an unacknowledged consciousness, accompanied by the suppression of the represented function.

> 3-1. The young men and women, dressed in their business suits, running down the escalator, as if the last train is approaching...
>
> 3-2. The casually dressed stand wherever there is space and do not crowd other people...
>
> 3-3. Elderly men and women stand back, as if afraid of the coming trains...
>
> 3-4. Young couples with babies in strollers have to move fast. People do not give them much room...
>
> 3-5. Finally, school children, full of laughter and joy, are always fun to watch...
>
> (Janice Grady, "Rush Hour Subway Riders," third draft)

The self reappears in the third draft, but only after the classes have been established and as a way of describing the classes with illustrative first-person narratives, as in (2-1), where the class of elderly men and women is illustrated by the narrative with the old man caught in the doors of the train.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis makes evident the unnaturalness of "autonomous" language, which requires that the writer's consciousness take a back seat. In a run-on commentary on her expository writing experiences, Janice Grady wrote about her classificatory essay: "Every time I started to write on a class of people, I was pulled back to the train station. I had to close my eyes and imagine various kinds of people in order to describe them. And I saw myself there like in the journal entry. Too much! You have to do all this pretending. I am not very good at it."

The draft-by-draft movement from the narrative to the final version of the classificatory essay appears to have gone through some distinct stages: the first written narrative, containing the germs of a classification but also strong features of an oral narrative, becomes a full-fledged narrative through accumulation of detail in the first draft; a true typology, based on age and behavior, largely detached from the personal experience(s) that underlie it, takes shape in the second and third drafts of the classificatory essay; the classes pigeonhole in a way in which an individual-rich reality can hardly be pigeonholed--one is hard put to find them in pure form. The writer's subjectivity (not just the presence of the pronoun "I") is still present till the last version, as it should in a typology created by leaps of imagination and with a sense of humor, rather than by strictly empirical scientific means.

It should be mentioned at this point that although this analysis has not been concerned with the cognitive dimensions of classification, it shares the thesis so persuasively put forth by Lakoff (1987), namely, that "human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination--of perception, motor

activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other" (8). The movement recorded here, from the narrative of personal experience to the classificatory essay in the form of a human typology, has focused instead on the written *expression* of that typology. While recent work on categorization has moved thinking about categorization away from the classical theory of categories as abstract containers, unrelated to experience, the conventions of the academic essay of classification have retained their classical rhetorical underpinnings: based on the scientific model, classifications have to be made from one constant perspective, and the classes have to have clear boundaries (and thus be exhaustive of the domain they cover) and have to be of equal status, and therefore symmetrical.

These conventional expectations made Foucault laugh so hard at Jorge Luis Borges' fictional taxonomy of animals, attributed to an ancient Chinese encyclopedia (1966). According to that taxonomy, "animals are divided into (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) other, (m)having just broken a vase, (n) those that from a long way off look like flies." (108).

The classification of subway riders is not, at any time or in any of its guises, a linking of inappropriate things, "breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things," as Foucault describes Borges' taxonomy (XV). In its first two versions, however, it does not follow accepted conventions regarding the writer's consciousness, with consequences in linguistic choice.

In fact, even the final essay itself belongs more to the genre of the personal essay, so warmly promoted by Wendell Harris (1996), than to the "dry as dust article that strives to create an atmosphere of total objectivity" (938). Its effect is authorial 'presence.' The categories of subway riders are experientially embodied. The progressive movement toward the autonomous language of academic discourse, with its Franklinian virtues of smoothness, clarity, and shortness (Bloom, 1996), as well as formal symmetry, is a movement that can be investigated in terms of consciousness.

The pedagogical implications of such an analysis are, I believe, obvious. In the process of literate action, with academic essays derived from narratives of personal experience, incongruous linguistic choices can thus be seen for what they are: irresistible returns to a consciousness that experienced and evaluated the events on the way to the autonomous language of academic discourse.

Notes

[1] Janice Grady is the real name of the author of the texts analyzed in this article. She gave me permission to use it and her texts, and was, indeed rather surprised that I entertained the possibility of using a fictitious name. Her permission is gratefully acknowledged in the spirit in which it was given: an author is never generic.

[2] The ambiguity that arises from the way Janice Grady uses the present tense was signaled to me by Wallace Chafe, for whose reading of and comments on a previous draft of this article I am very thankful. The responsibility for all the injustice I may have done to his elegant theory or to Janice Grady's writings rests entirely with me.

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Figure 1

Modes and Functions of Consciousness

		Represented Function
Extroverted Consciousness	Immediate Mode	
		Representing Function
		Represented Function
Introverted Consciousness	Displaced Mode	
		Representing Function